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Infrastructure Planning in Rural Massachusetts 
 
Jeanne H. Armstrong, Meir Gross, John R. Mullin and Robert D. Yaro 
 
 
Abstract – This paper describes the importance of understanding and dealing with the problems of 
infrastructure planning and maintenance in rural communities.  Infrastructure is defined to include roads, 
bridges, water and wastewater collection and treatment systems, and public buildings and capital 
equipment.  The authors base their findings primarily on the experience of communities in Massachusetts, 
but these findings are readily applied to the situation of rural communities elsewhere in the U.S.A. and 
other developed countries.  Three major conclusions are presented in the paper: the need for rural 
communities to develop long-range plans for infrastructure maintenance and finance; the need to develop 
effective local institutions to assume this responsibility, and the importance of managing growth in fast-
growing rural areas in order to minimize the need for major expansion of infrastructure systems. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 This paper presents the results of a study of rural infrastructure problems in 
Massachusetts.  While the laboratory was one State in the U.S.A., the results are 
applicable to situations in mature regions of many developed countries, where tight 
budgets and decaying infrastructure often go hand in hand.  To us, infrastructure means 
the system of roads, sewers, water lines, electrical lines and structures that are under 
municipal control.1   
 
 The findings of this study will be relevant to other mature industrial regions in the 
U.S.A. and other developed countries now experiencing the need for replacement of 
infrastructure.  The deterioration of infrastructure has been discussed extensively in the 
professional, academic and popular literature in the U.S.A., U.K. and other countries,2 
and therefore the experience in Massachusetts should be of interest to officials and 
academics dealing with this problem. 
 
 This paper will discuss, first, the problems of rapid growth, fiscal austerity, and 
administrative lack of information that have led to the decline of rural infrastructure.  
Second, it will delineate possible solutions to these problems.  In both sections, examples 
based on the experience of rural communities in Massachusetts will serve as illustrations. 
 
 Finally, this paper will draw the connection between infrastructure planning and 
growth management that can and must be made if rural areas are to cope with both issues. 
 
The study area 
 
 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is a small State with remarkable cultural 
and geographic diversity.  Its 7825 square miles are divided into 312 towns and 39 cities.  
Mountains, forests and farmland and 1200 miles of coastline divide the State into several 
distinct geographic regions.3 
 
 Sixty per cent of the State’s population lives in the 101 cities and towns of 
metropolitan Boston.  On the coast and in the western mountains, rural communities 
struggle to attract, and then cope with, recreational development and tourism.  Between 
these extremes lie the more typically patterned communities – small central cities with 
their suburban rings and out-lying rural towns. 
 
 Massachusetts’ political system is marked by strong State and local governments, 
with a decidedly weak county system.  Local control has been fiercely protected for 350 
years and most communities – even some that have grown into cities – maintain the town 
meeting form of government, whereby all voting residents of the community serve as its 
legislative body.  Local governments tend to be headed by non-professional (and often 
volunteer, unpaid) elected executives; less than 15% of Massachusetts’ local 
governments are headed by professional town or city managers.4  Under this system, part-
time elected ‘boards of selectmen’ serve as the executive branch of town governments.  
Regional identification, whether among the people of the Berkshire Hills in the west or 
those on Cape Cod on the south-east coast, often seems stronger than any loyalty to the 
Commonwealth as a whole.  This spirit of autonomism, as will be suggested later, 
strongly affects infrastructure problems in the State. 
 
The rural infrastructure problem: cases and causes 
 
Growth patterns 
 
 Much of Massachusetts’ infrastructure is a product of an industrial development 
and settlement pattern that developed in the last half of the 19th and early 20th centuries.  
Early in that period, more than 30 mill cities sprung up throughout the State, generally 
near sources of water power or ports of entry.  Many of these cities were planned 
industrial cities with sophisticated systems of water supply, sewage collection, 
transportation, and power distribution.5   
 
 It should also be noted that the problems of rural infrastructure in some 
Massachusetts communities closely parallel those of the Commonwealth’s urban regions 
(as well as those of other States and industrial countries) given the age of the 
infrastructure present in these older mill towns. 
 
 By the 1950s and 1960s, however, most of these cities were experiencing severe 
economic decline, and their infrastructure was becoming outmoded and deteriorated.  
During this period, a major population shift into suburban areas brought with it political 
pressures for new highways, sewer and water systems and other infrastructure 
development.6 
 
 Like most other regions in the country, Massachusetts experienced rapid rural 
growth during the period 1970-1980, with non-metropolitan areas growing 19% at a time 
when metropolitan areas of the Commonwealth were slowly losing population.  These 
trends have continued since 1980, with rural areas increasing in population by 5%, while 
metropolitan areas increased by less than 1%.  In many towns on the exurban fringes of 
Boston and in rural south-eastern Massachusetts, growth rates of 15% per year are not 
uncommon, bringing with them pressures for rapid development of infrastructure 
(Duncan, quoted in Mullin and Thomas, 1985, pp. 119-164). 
 
 Given the Commonwealth’s booming economy (driven by strong high-technology 
and service sectors), preferences for rural living, revolutions in communications and 
long-distance commuting, and major new industrial development on the fringes of 
metropolitan areas (readily accessible to most rural areas of Massachusetts), it is expected 
that growth in rural areas and the need for consequent infrastructure development will 
continue for the foreseeable future.7 
 
 At the same time, it should be noted that the sprawling, low-density land use 
patterns occurring in many rural areas, by requiring longer roads and utility lines between 
structures, make for high infrastructure development costs. 
 
Public attitudes 
 
 The pressures created by Massachusetts’ growth patterns are worsened by public 
attitudes wrought during the fiscal crises of the 1970s.  Prior to the beginning of the 
current high-technology boom, the State was experiencing severe decline in its older, 
mostly nondurable goods-based manufacturing economy, at the same time that its defense 
and aerospace industries were also experiencing federal cutbacks.  By 1975, the State was 
functionally bankrupt, the cost of local services was among the highest in the nation, and 
the overwhelming dependence on the property tax for local revenues had fostered the 
nickname ‘Taxachusetts’ (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). 
 
 Then, as now, bonds constituted the long-term debt of municipalities.  Cities and 
towns, upon determining the need for infrastructure improvements, entered the bond 
market where, in return for investor’s capital, they pledged their faith and credit to pay 
back the debt with interest over a period of 20-30 years.  The rationale for this approach 
was to keep the tax rate as low as possible, and to pay for capital improvements over the 
life of these improvements. 
 
 Such long-term debt, however, became increasingly unpopular in the face of more 
immediate budgetary problems.  The amount of money spent on infrastructure continued 
to decline. 
 
 In 1980 the Commonwealth’s voters enacted by referendum a rate-capping law 
modeled after California’s Proposition 13.  Popularly known as Proposition 2 ½, this law 
limited local property tax rates to 3.5% of market value.  Proposition 2 ½ gave all 
communities 3 years to reduce tax levels to the 2.5% level, and permitted increases in 
property taxes of only 2 ½% per year thereafter.  The citizens of Massachusetts were 
concerned that their property tax payments were too high relative to the services they 
were receiving and relative to taxes in the rest of the nation.  After the tax cap was 
passed, tax payments became quite moderate compared to other States.  Once 
communities reach the 2.5% limit, however, the only way to raise additional property tax 
money is through new development, or improvements to existing structures (see Suskind, 
1983). 
 
 With this as background, one can perhaps more readily understand the desire to 
control spending and focus solely on ‘essentials’.  Essentials have not, and to a large 
degree still do not, include maintaining infrastructure. 
 
The problem of spending 
 
 Massachusetts’ economy suffered dramatically during the 1970s.  With the end of 
the Viet Nam War came a phasing down of defense industries; with cutbacks in the 
national space program space-related firms laid off thousands of workers.  Thousands of 
military-related jobs at armories, airbases and army bases were lost.  All of this occurred 
while mature industries were in decline, which combined with a series of national 
economic recessions to create a fiscal crisis for State government.8 
 
 From this climate emerged a deeply-ingrained reluctance to spend.  Since the 
mid-1970s local municipalities have continued to cut back on infrastructure maintenance 
and replacement.  Massachusetts, in adjusted dollars, spent 20% less on infrastructure in 
1979-81 than in 1974-76.  Significantly, 1975 and 1976 were especially bad years for the 
State economy.  What these figures show is that the reluctance to invest in infrastructure 
is not a new phenomenon.  Rather, communities began to shift to other priorities ten 
years ago.9 
 
 Proposition 2 ½ contributed significantly to the failure of spending to keep pace 
with infrastructure needs.  A review of State figures shows that the impact was most 
severe in terms of capital expenditures – although maintenance was cut as well.  Needed 
(and desired) roads, sewer and water system expansions and school proposals were 
postponed or dropped.  Street maintenance programs, which had been curtailed long 
before Proposition 2 ½ was passed, were further reduced (see Armstrong et al., 1985). 
 
 Proposition 2 ½ virtually eliminated the remaining capital improvement planning 
efforts at the local level.  It should also be noted that the tax cap was put in place at the 
same time that the Federal Government was cutting back on its grants to local 
communities for infrastructure assistance.10  The combination forced communities to live 
with what they had whether it was well or poorly maintained. 
 
 A look at one city’s investment in parks equipment will show the scope of the 
problem.  In 1968, the city of Chicopee floated a bond to bring all of its equipment up to 
date.  Since that time, three major firms left the city, a nearby military base closed and 
Proposition 2 ½ reduced money available for the local budget.  In 1982, the city closed 
much of its parks programs, cut back its staff and junked much of its equipment – it was 
simply beyond repair.  The problem became so severe that in 1983 the parks department 
staff, which also did cemetery maintenance, was forced to hand-dig graves.  Three years 
later, the city has not replaced its equipment.  All of this occurred in a city with a sound 
fiscal standing, a good bond rating and relatively few unemployed.  There was clearly no 
reason to allow this equipment to deteriorate, other than a reluctance to invest in the 
city’s future capital needs (Mullin, 1983). 
 
 This study identified this attitude in many of the communities examined.  Local 
communities have so little confidence in the health of the economy that they are 
unwilling to make large financial commitments.  Thus, expenditures are largely short-
term and repair-oriented rather than maintenance- or enhancement-oriented. 
 
 In reality, most communities can afford to invest in infrastructure.  Over the past 
two decades Massachusetts cities and towns have been steadily decreasing their long-
term debts.  The net result is that the debt of these cities and towns is well below the 
national average and likely to move even lower as money borrowed in the 1960s is 
repaid.  This means that the ability to raise funds is not a major problem from the 
standpoint of debt but it is a problem politically.11 
 
 More and more, local officials appear to be meeting their constituents’ demands 
for sound fiscal planning by ignoring expensive, if necessary, infrastructural 
improvements.  Forms of infrastructure that cannot be seen – e.g. water, sewer and other 
utility lines, and drainage systems – result in little public awareness of political benefits 
to elected officials, and tend therefore to receive a low priority when limited available 
funds are allocated.12 
 
 Perhaps more importantly, approximately one-third of Massachusetts’ towns, 
mostly in rural areas, have no bond rating from Moody’s, have no bond counsel and no 
underwriting house.  Moody’s Investment Service is a New-York-based nation-wide 
investment analysis firm that provides detailed evaluation of the capabilities of cities and 
towns to pay back bonds.  Generally, a well-governed, economically healthy, low-debted 
city will have a high rating.  A city with questionable government practices, a weak 
economic base and high debt will, on the other hand, score quite low.  This means that 
these communities, before even entering the market, must put time, effort and money into 
the process.  Because the overwhelming majority of these towns rely on non-professional 
executives and volunteers, the more sophisticated financing options are rarely taken. 
 
 This phenomenon is illustrated by the example of a small Berkshire County 
community which is now considering whether to ‘float’ a bond for needed infrastructure 
improvements.  The cost of preparing for the bond issue (of approximately $1,300,000) 
has been estimated at more than $10,000.  The figure itself may seem slight, but in a town 
with no surplus funds, and where taxes cannot be raised further, it means that something 
else must be cut.  Often in town meetings, where budgetary decisions are made, the 
$10,000 will be compared to the cost of a needed service such as a teacher’s salary.  The 
net effect is that bonds are rarely floated in small, rural towns (interview with J. De Rosa, 
Co-Chairperson, Governor’s Task Force on Economic Development in the Northern 
Berkshires, 20 May 1985; see also Armstrong et al., 1986b). 
 
 
 
The problem of management 
 
 With the exception of northern Maine, all of New England is divided into political 
subdivisions, which in many cases for more than 350 years have been responsible for 
delivery of nearly all public services.  Unlike the rest of the country, county government 
and regional planning have never taken root in Massachusetts and elsewhere in the 
region, and annexation of urbanizing areas is unheard of.  For these reasons, in most of 
rural New England public services are the responsibility of town governments led by 
part-time, volunteer officials.  The local legislative bodies – town meetings – get together 
but once a year, in a not always well-organized fashion, to pass budgets and adopt 
necessary bylaws. 
 
 Although this system has worked well for a long time, the governments of fast-
growing rural communities are besieged by the combined pressures of expanding 
workloads, State and Federal red tape, and the need to develop roads, water and sewer 
systems and other services for new residents, many of whom insist on services they 
received in their former urban and suburban hometowns.  Volunteers simply cannot keep 
up with these demands.  In most Massachusetts towns, for example, subdivision bylaws 
exist stating the conditions under which a developer can build in a particular area.  
Detailed site plans must be submitted and approved by the town before any work can be 
started.  This creates so much work for the town, however, that little time remains to do 
strategic planning.  Likewise, conservation commissions (local bodies created by State 
law, to plan for conservation of each town’s natural resources), are so busy monitoring 
development proposals that they have no time for open-space planning or other 
conservation efforts.13 
 
 There are more than 130 towns in Massachusetts with no full-time administrators.  
With only part-time, voluntary leadership, little innovation, day-to-day management, or 
even grant writing is likely to occur.  The small town of Pelham, in western 
Massachusetts, is an excellent example: the community has had a number of serious 
infrastructure needs, including deteriorating roads, an open-air road salt storage site 
which was polluting local water supplies, and a much needed new municipal building.  
While grants were (and are) available to handle all three problems, it took more than five 
years for volunteers to handle just the first two while each year the problems become 
more difficult to correct.  The third problem has only recently been addressed, at a time 
when the granting agency is cutting back on its programs. 
 
 Division of responsibilities for infrastructure among several town departments is 
common, and it exacerbates the problems of voluntary, non-professional and 
decentralized management.  Local highways are the responsibility of town public works 
departments, while water and sewer systems are controlled by local, yet separate water 
and sewer departments each under the supervision of separate appointed boards made up 
of citizen volunteers.  Each department maintains its own systems according to its own 
methods and standards.  The net result is that it is difficult to monitor, evaluate and 
control the various agencies as they use and maintain the systems and facilities.  Why 
does a truck last twice as long in one department then another, given equal use and age?  
The answer is inevitably tied to differing maintenance standards. 
 
 Each department has the responsibility of preparing an annual budget covering its 
annual operating expenses.  Typically, the Board of Selectmen (the town’s ‘executive’) 
will demand a budget with an increase of no more than 4%, including salary raises.  The 
department heads follow directions and, fully realizing there is no money for additional 
expenditures ignore any infrastructural improvements beyond the most critical of 
emergencies.  Once the budget is resolved and if the town is still below its tax cap 
maximum, it may then provide some funds for capital improvements. 
 
 One of the great ironies of the present situation is that despite rapid growth in 
rural areas, a number of small cities located in rural regions continue to lag in 
employment, income and other indices of economic well being.  Possessed with a rich 
architectural and cultural heritage, and a well-developed infrastructure system, each of 
these communities has the potential to serve as a magnet for new development in its 
region.  In 1975, the Government of Massachusetts began to encourage economic 
development in these cities.  Several such efforts continue but no systematic effort is in 
place to lessen the pressure of development on rural or exurban areas by encouraging 
development in the cities which have the necessary infrastructure and the willingness to 
accommodate new development. 
 
Problems caused by State infrastructure planning efforts 
 
 Beginning in the 1970s, Massachusetts’ State Government became increasingly 
and directly involved in many aspects of local decision-making.  Nowhere was this more 
evident than in terms of infrastructure development.  At present there are 24 State-
supported and Federal local aid programs that address capital improvement needs.  
However, with the exception of aid for water supply systems, these State and Federal 
programs are heavily weighted toward supporting new construction rather than upgrading 
and maintaining existing systems.14  Several problems have emerged from these State and 
Federal programs. 
 
 First, local planners tend to think of investment needs in terms of how to obtain 
State funds.  Local objectives are shaped, not by careful consideration and community 
consensus regarding the long-term future of the town, rather by what the State will 
finance.  Local officials, often citizens’ committees, are caught up in the grant-writing 
cycle, chasing after doubtful funding for capital expenditures, the actual needs for which 
the citizens have not completely considered.  Indeed, in many rural towns, part of the 
problem rests with the town planner, or grantsperson, who is under considerable pressure 
to bring dollars into the community.  The amount of money becomes more important than 
the actual need for which it is intended. 
 
 Most governmental grants-in-aid for infrastructure improvements (among others) 
come to communities either on an entitlement basis (the communities get them 
automatically) or on a discretionary basis (they must apply for the funds).  Usually, the 
smaller the community, the less likely it will be to be eligible for entitlement funds.  Left 
to compete for discretionary funds, however, rural towns often lack that expertise to 
negotiate programs created by more sophisticated urban administrators.  Nor can they 
afford to hire more people to do it for them.  In short, discretionary grants go to the 
professionally-run, well-financed towns.  They do not go to small, volunteer-run 
communities. 
 
 The third problem with State infrastructure programs is that changes in the 
formulas that determine State aid make it virtually impossible for towns to budget over 
time.  A formula can be base, for example, on population, unemployment, age of housing, 
percentage of people on welfare or, among others, the number of school-age children.  It 
can even be a combination of factors.  The problem is that the legislature has constantly 
tinkered with the formula to the point that it is impossible to predict from year to year 
how much State aid will be given to a particular community.  The net effect is that the 
funds go to short-term projects free from long-term commitments. 
 
 Finally, the State will often provide assistance to a community only if it meets 
conditions that have nothing to do with the grant in question.  For example, each city and 
town, in order to be eligible for State grants must submit a Fair Housing Plan.  The plan 
must show that the community is making a good faith effort to house the region’s poor.  
The town of Hadley in the Connecticut River Valley recently applied for a grant to 
restore its historic town common and make infrastructural improvements.  From all 
accounts, the town had met the letter and spirit of the rules for entry and ranked high 
enough to gain the funds on the rating scheme prepared by the professional staff.  
However, since it did not have its Fair Housing Plan in order, the grant was denied.  One 
can argue the merits of such an approach.  The net result however is the loss of a grant 
designed to meet a local need. 
 
Summary of problems 
 
 When combined with the already urgent requirements for reconstruction of urban 
infrastructure, the phenomenon of rapid rural growth will make the infrastructure needs 
of the Commonwealth’s rural areas as compelling in the 1980s and 1990s as were the 
needs of suburban areas in the 1950s and 1960s.   
 
 In the light of the dearth of public support for infrastructure investments, the lack 
of professional management in town government, and the financial constraints imposed 
on communities by Proposition 2 ½ and expected cutbacks in Federal aid, rural 
communities will be compelled to find new ways to design, finance and manage 
infrastructure improvements.  State and local governments must create growth 
management efforts to foster those development patterns that minimize expensive 
infrastructure investments. 
 
 The remainder of this paper will outline some of the options available to local and 
state officials which could achieve these objectives. 
 
The rural infrastructure problem: towards a solution 
 
Philosophical changes 
 
 The first step in solving Massachusetts’ infrastructure dilemma is a change in the 
basic approach to infrastructure planning by local governments. 
 
 Communities as diverse as Ramapo, New York, Petaluma, California, Boulder, 
Colorado, and Montgomery County, Maryland have made infrastructure plans an integral 
part of comprehensive plans to manage rapid suburban and exurban growth.15  Such plans 
can be employed to control the costs and timing of infrastructure improvements by: 
placing water and sewer lines, roads and other improvements only where growth is 
desired; making decisions about the size and capacity of improvements in the light of 
growth plans for areas to be served by those improvements; making land-use decisions 
based on the carrying capacity of underlying natural systems, e.g. subsurface hydrology, 
surface drainage and floodplains, and the ability of soils to handle anticipated septic 
loads.  If Massachusetts communities were to adopt this approach to infrastructure 
planning, they could improve the quality of both their growth management and 
infrastructure planning.  Growing rural communities, for example, could determine 
development locations and densities that would be consistent with the availability of 
groundwater and the ability of soils to handle septic loads.  In this way, they could 
accommodate growth, and still preclude the need for expensive municipal water supply 
and wastewater collection and treatment facilities.  This strategy will become 
increasingly attractive as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) grants for 
water supply and wastewater treatment facilities are phased out.  In areas such as Cape 
Cod, which is dependent on a sole-source aquifer for all its potable water, this approach 
could mean the difference between sustainable development and the destruction of the 
natural system upon which the habitability of the region is based.16 
 
Design and engineering changes 
 
 One way of reducing the costs of necessary infrastructure improvements will be to 
develop new design and engineering standards for public improvements which meet the 
needs of rural communities. 
 
 In the area of rural roadway design, for example, adherence to design standards of 
the American Association of State Highway & Transportation Officials (AASHTO) 
results in roads which are incompatible with rural landscapes and far more costly to 
construct than necessary. 
 
 The recent proposal to realign several miles of Route 2 through the Wendell State 
Forest in western Massachusetts illustrates the point.  AASHTO standards for the 
proposed road would require 14-ft travel lanes, paved shoulders and deceleration lanes, 
grades and sight lines allowing 55 mph travel and reconfiguration of slopes and 
vegetation to allow winter sunlight onto the roadway to reduce icing.  Also required 
would be the usual collection of expensive safety features including reinforced concrete 
safety barriers (known as ‘Jersey Barriers’), and steel ribbon guardrails.  The resulting 
design yields a 600-ft wide right-of-way and massive destruction of State forest land and 
produces construction costs of several million dollars per mile.  All this ‘over design’ 
results in a realigned two-lane roadway yielding a 59-second reduction in travel time 
when compared to the existing alignment. 
 
 Reevaluation of such excessive and inappropriate Federal and State highway 
design standards could yield huge savings in both natural and financial resources.  On the 
local level, subdivision bylaws often include excessive design standards for roadways, 
drainage, lighting, underground utilities and other public improvements that cost 
developers and homebuyers more in the short run, and cost communities more in 
maintenance and replacement expenses in the long run.  This has occurred in some 
instances in rural Massachusetts towns which adopted ‘carbon copy’ subdivision bylaws, 
literally copied by consultants or town officials from other, often more urban, community 
bylaws. 
 
 In the central Massachusetts town of Monson, for example, the subdivision bylaw 
adopted by the town several years ago includes grading requirements for roadways which 
simply cannot be met in this hilly town without creating a major quarry or sand removal 
operation at the site of each new subdivision road.  When combined with excessive 
roadway widths, drainage, lighting, sidewalk, and underground utility requirements, such 
bylaws can increase the infrastructure costs to new residents by several thousand dollars 
per housing unit. 
 
 The resulting subdivisions are so costly, in fact, that in rural towns like Monson 
few subdivisions are built.  Instead, development spreads up and down existing roads in 
frontage lots, requiring longer utility lines and damaging the visual character of the 
community. 
 
 For this reason, both State and Federal agencies should review development 
standards for appropriateness to rural areas, and where applicable, new standards should 
be developed which are more cost-effective and compatible with rural needs. 
 
Administrative changes 
 
 As we have seen, the way towns allocate funds to infrastructure needs is basic to 
their infrastructure problem.  As long as the capital budget is considered only when some 
money is left over after the operational budget is completed, there will be no 
improvement.  Capital planning and budgeting cannot be lumped together with 
operational budgeting.  Rather, the capital budget must be considered an on-going and 
constant part of the budget allocation process. 
 
 The first step in carrying out this capital planning process is to inventory the 
infrastructure assets in the community.  Few communities have a comprehensive listing 
of their assets.  The town of Amesbury, for example, is now in the midst of developing its 
first inventory of capital facilities since 1921. 
 A second critical step is an evaluation of these physical assets.  The condition of 
the facilities, their effectiveness, and future needs of the community, need to be 
determined.  The problem of leak detection for water and sewer systems is particularly 
crucial.  Many of these systems were built at the turn of the century and have become 
outdated.  The problem has become so severe that the State government is now willing to 
pay 50% of the cost of leak detection and repair if the municipalities pay the remaining 
half.  Infrastructural systems must be evaluated if our increasingly scarce and costly 
resources are to be protected (for an analysis of this problem, see Male et al., 1985, pp. 1-
20). 
 
 The greatest need at the local level, in terms of the capital planning process, is the 
formation of a capital improvement committee, staffed by knowledgeable citizens who 
have the confidence of policy-makers, department heads and the public at large.  Above 
all, it should have a banker and a lawyer, for if a bond is required their services will be 
invaluable.  The reason for this is that the legal and financial process is extremely 
complex.  A person with legal experience and/or banking experience can ensure that the 
process is carried out correctly and with a mind toward prudent investment.  Very few of 
our cities and towns have such organizations and even fewer have effective ones. 
 
 Other management innovations can enhance the development of capital planning 
at the local level.  If a town is fearful of floating a bond or spending capital to purchase a 
piece of equipment then leasing may be an option.  For example, the Town of Andover, 
Massachusetts, recently sold its town hall and leased back space within it.  The assets of 
such an approach are several: (1) maintenance of the building is no longer a public 
function; (2) the property, no longer a public building, is on the tax rolls, and (3) the city 
has more cash in its coffers.  The city of North Adams, Massachusetts is considering such 
an option as a means of attracting a State courthouse: the city will buy a building, 
renovate it, sell it to a developer and then guarantee the developer that the court will be a 
tenant for ten years. 
 
 A second example is the development of mutual aid pacts on equipment.  
Neighboring towns often invest in identical equipment that is not used more than 
occasionally.  Capital outlays would clearly go further by towns sharing the cost, use and 
maintenance of such equipment.  Most rural areas of Massachusetts participate in 
regional school districts; this concept could be adapted for delivery of other public 
services, such as highways, water supply, wastewater treatment, solid waste management.  
State incentives should be made available to communities which pursue this approach. 
 
 A third example, and perhaps the most simple one, involves the setting of fees to 
recover the cost of operation and maintenance of infrastructure systems from those who 
use them.  For example, if a new subdivision of 100 homes is to be connected to the local 
sewer system, the cost should be borne by the developer and new residents. 
 
 State assistance to local governments must be provided if such innovations are to 
be effected.  One approach would be to develop the expertise of local officials through 
university training programs in finance, planning, management, etc. 
 At the same time the administration of State and Federal grant programs can be 
tailored to rural communities’ needs, for example by streamlining the guidelines and 
application procedures for grant programs which in many cases are designed for urban 
communities and their professional staffs.  Grant programs for rural infrastructure 
programs should be designed with volunteer governments in mind, with simplified 
application requirements.  ‘Circuit riders’ should be made available to provide technical 
assistance.  The term ‘circuit rider’ is used in Massachusetts for State paid experts in 
local management who will travel between small towns to help the communities keep 
their management systems in order.  The program, at present, is quite small. 
 
 Most importantly, towns should consider hiring professional staff, perhaps with 
assistance from high levels of government.  Towns should also find ways to consolidate 
often fragmented administrative structures currently dealing with capital improvements. 
 
The need for statewide infrastructure and strategic planning 
 
 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts now recognizes the urgency of its 
infrastructure problems, as evidenced by continuing, but as yet unsuccessful efforts to 
pass legislation authorizing creation of the Massachusetts Infrastructure Bank 
(‘MassBank’), which would finance both State and local infrastructure investments, and 
act as a wholesaler for locally initiated infrastructure bonding.  One of the factors 
exacerbating Massachusetts’ infrastructure crisis is the complete lack of strategic or 
growth management planning at the State level.  Massachusetts is now the only State in 
the north-east without a strategic planning office in State government.  Consequently, at a 
time when the State’s economy is rapidly expanding, there is no unit of government 
responsible for assessing the cumulative impact of rapid industrial and residential 
development on the natural resources, communities and infrastructure of Massachusetts.  
Clearly what is required is effective strategic planning at the State level for 
Massachusetts’ infrastructure needs. 
 
 A Strategic Planning or State Planning Office (or expansion of the role of the 
existing Governor’s Office of Economic Development from its current short-range 
planning responsibilities) could improve the coordination of various State agencies 
engaged in infrastructure planning and investment, and could aid local governments in 
their infrastructure planning.  One immediate priority for such a new entity would be a 
systematic Statewide assessment of infrastructure needs for individual communities, 
regions and the Commonwealth as a whole.  This effort should be carried out in 
cooperation with local governments, given the strong role of municipalities (noted 
earlier) in infrastructure planning and development.  This effort should also be 
coordinated with a Statewide effort to identify resource conservation priorities which 
could be safeguarded through comprehensive planning for infrastructure investments. 
 
 The Commonwealth must recognize the inter-relationship between infrastructure 
planning and growth management planning at the State and local level.  Without this 
function at the highest level in State government, Massachusetts will continue to suffer 
from inadequate or outmoded infrastructure which will undercut needed economic 
development efforts in some regions, while allowing inappropriate development in other 
areas which may be in conflict with the Commonwealth’s resource conservation 
objectives. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Rapid growth in rural Massachusetts communities has brought new pressures to 
bear on their infrastructure systems.  Small-town volunteer governments are ill-equipped 
to plan for the design requirements and expense of infrastructure development.  
Hampered by public reluctance to spend and their own lack of information, small-town 
officials often end up ignoring the deterioration of their infrastructure altogether. 
 
 It must be recognized that the infrastructure needs of rural communities are 
different from those in urban settings.  Small-town officials must be helped to inventory 
and evaluate their physical assets and identify local needs.  They need to share expertise, 
train volunteer administrators and use innovative techniques such as leasing, mutual aid 
pacts, and fee-setting to reduce infrastructure costs.  They must also adopt design and 
engineering standards appropriate to rural areas and keep capital planning and budgeting 
separate from operational budgeting. 
 
 Using such techniques, rural communities, both in Massachusetts and elsewhere 
in the U.S.A. and overseas, can begin to gain some control over the condition of their 
infrastructure.  Perhaps most importantly, however, rural communities must work with 
the State or higher level of government to make infrastructure planning an integral part of 
the strategic growth management process. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 For an overview of the infrastructure problem in a national perspective see Choate and Walter (1983) and 
Barker (1984). 
2
 For an overview on the issue of deteriorating infrastructure, and the relationship between infrastructure 
and economic development, see Webley (1985), Reid and Sullivan (1984) and Reid (1984).  For a 
discussion of similar trends and problems elsewhere in the U.S. see Associated General Contractors of 
America (1983) and Subcommittee on Economic Goals and Intergovernmental Policy (1984).  For a 
discussion of Britain’s infrastructure problems see Confederation of British Industry (1984) and 
Department of Transport (1983). 
3
 For a review of the problems and opportunities facing the Commonwealth see Mullin and Thomas (1985). 
4
 This problem is discussed at some length in Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation (1984). 
5
 For a review of the characteristics of these towns see Dunwell (1978). 
6
 These problems are described and analyzed in Polenske et al. (1983). 
7
 For a discussion of the impact of this booming economy see Marsh (1986). 
8
 This problem, amongst others, is analyzed in the Governor’s Commission on the Future of Mature 
Industries (1984). 
9
 Recent data collected on 17 cities and towns in Massachusetts shows that the trend is continuing.  See 
Armstrong et al. (1986). 
10
 This need is clearly delineated in the United States Conference of Mayors and the National League of 
Cities (1983), see, for example, p. IV. 
                                                                                                                                                 
11
 Data collected from our recent surveys shows that all seventeen cities and towns reviewed had the ability 
to meet their infrastructure needs through bonds while staying below the State-imposed tax cap.  See 
Armstrong et al. (1986, pp. 28-29). 
12
 A by-product of this attitude is that new housing is being placed on larger lots.  This means that buyers 
have to be more affluent.  In effect, the less willing a community is to provide modern infrastructural 
improvements, the more likely this community is to be of the upper income class.  See Hirsch (1983). 
13
 The Conservation Commission Movement gained increasing momentum in Massachusetts throughout the 
late 1950s and early 1960s and ultimately became encoded in law in the late 1960s.  For approximately a 
decade the movement met its mandate with zeal.  Now with the environmental crisis increasingly out of the 
public eye, many of these commissions are becoming increasingly bureaucratic (interview with Andrew 
Scheffey, conservationist and professor of regional planning, 29 January 1986). 
14
 For a further explanation see Wallace, Floyd, Ellenzweig, Moore Incorporated (1978). 
15
 For a review of how this management occurs see Floyd (1981).  In particular see Chapter 29, ‘Land-use 
Policy Issues’. 
16
 For an analysis of this problem as it relates to Cape Cod see the University of Massachusetts Department 
of Landscape Architecture and Regional Planning (1985).  The report was prepared for the New Alchemy 
Institute. 
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